vents vividly highlight the relative lack of understanding of the resources of the oceans and of the impacts of human activity on them. To this must be coupled the rapid rate of expansion of activities and consequent threats to marine biodiversity in general. These discoveries raise hard questions about how best to manage and conserve biodiversity in the oceans. As these questions arise, so do questions about who has authority to make decisions about the future of the myriad of species that combine to make up that biodiversity. Will legal regimes be effective if established by States alone or is there a need for other actors to be engaged in decision-making or in the development of the regimes? If there is a need, then what should the nature of that involvement be? 1 Most regimes aimed at protecting marine biodiversity demonstrate a willingness to engage with non-State actors in the development or implementation of the regimes. Indeed in international law more generally, non-State actors have been involved in the development and implementation *With thanks to the secretariats of the regional seas organisations for their help in tracking down various rules of procedure and to the editors for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. All errors remain the author's alone.
of the law for a considerable length of time. 2 Their role has gone through various stages with their influence ebbing and flowing across the decades.
More recently the perception has been both that the influence of non-State actors, and NGOs in particular, has increased and that their role ought to be enhanced. This chapter examines the provision for non-State actor involvement in the legal regimes concerned with the conservation of marine biodiversity. Non-state actors do of course engage with decision-making processes in other less formal ways, lobbying States being one example. While the importance of such activities is acknowledged, this chapter focuses solely on formal engagement with non-State actors.
The chapter begins with a brief review of some of the theoretical underpinnings for the involvement of non-State actors, before moving on to review the provision made for their engagement in the regimes addressing the protection or management of marine biodiversity. Consideration is given to the justifications given for having participatory processes, the form that participation takes (focussing on participation within treaty and relevant soft law regimes), and the fit between form and any stated objectives of participation. It also considers the impact that the chosen form may have on the levels and types of participation, and ultimately the impact participation may have on the quality or legitimacy of the decisions taken. The objective is to provide a taxonomy of participation within the regimes that are focussed upon the protection of marine biodiversity.
Engaging With Non-State Actors: Justifications and Limitations 2 Steve Charnovitz, 'Two centuries of participation: NGOs and international governance ' (1997) There are a variety of reasons for engaging non-State actors in decisionmaking. Although it may not be possible to point to a binding norm in international law requiring participatory rights for non-State actors, 3 it is possible that such a right is emerging or will emerge in the future. 4 In the meantime there are other practical reasons for providing such rights. For example, there is a substantial body of literature predicated upon the argument that the effectiveness of international regimes rests upon their legitimacy. 5 While there are a number of possible routes to legitimacy, such as the constructivist route expounded by Brunée and Toope, one route that has gained considerable support is to ensure that regimes are based upon deliberative democratic processes that engage with non-State actors. 6 The latter route is followed in this chapter. The next few paragraphs provide a brief introduction to the relationship between engagement with non-State actors and legitimacy and that relationship is returned to throughout the chapter.
Where once theory and practice may have led one to conclude that the requirement for deliberative democracy may be satisfied by ensuring that any and all interested States have an opportunity to participate, that no longer appears to be sufficient and practice across many areas of international law now demonstrates engagement with non-State actors. 7 Such practice has led to a positive demonstration that engagement with NGOs (and other non-State actors) can make a substantial contribution to improving the legitimacy of decision-making within international regimes. 8 This may be as a result of simple engagement with non-State actors, or because engagement allows those actors to highlight poor decisions 9 thus leading to better quality decision-making. They may also improve the quality of decision-making through their relative freedom to champion certain developments, which
States may lack the freedom to do. 10 Equally, the failure to include non-State actors directly in the decision-making process does not preclude their influence on decisions through lobbying activities, 11 but the perception of undue influence that may arise as a result of such action could undermine the perceived legitimacy of an organisation or regime. Thus there may be a need to provide input to decision-making by non-State actors through formal transparent participatory processes, which may be viewed as more legitimate.
The substantial body of general literature that explains why participatory decision-making is beneficial also supports the international law literature promoting the use of participatory processes. 12 The arguments presented in the general literature include that participatory processes enhance problemsolving abilities and provide access to additional information and perspectives not otherwise available to decision-makers. A further argument is based on the acknowledgement that science and the technocracy can never have the capacity to provide absolute certainty of result, which leads to the conclusion that uncertainty is a normal part of scientific understanding. Thus, if society is to make decisions on the basis of what is acknowledged to be uncertain information, then participatory processes are necessary to ensure that the resulting decisions maintain legitimacy. Without deliberative democracy the decisions risk (in the context of uncertainty) becoming obviously based upon the preferences or prejudices of the bureaucrats or political elite that make them.
There are however, certain counter arguments to the involvement of nonState actors in decision-making processes. Central to these is the positivist argument that the only recognised subjects of international law with the capacity to make international law are States. 13 The argument is that non-State actors, and NGOs in particular, are not recognised as full subjects of international law. They therefore do not have capacity to engage in lawmaking activities as such activities are, under the positivist rule of recognition, reserved for subjects with full international legal capacity i.e.
States. This argument, of course, ignores the fact that international law does now recognise the various forms or degrees of personality granted to nonState actors. 14 Further arguments have been developed with regard to the inclusion of NGOs, in particular, in international decision-making. One is that NGOs representing a particular narrow interest group or section of global society may change the power balance in an international organisation. If, for example, the result of their involvement is to marginalise developing States, the efficacy of engaging with NGOs may be questioned. 15 In addition, some have argued that allowing non-State actors, and NGOs in particular, a seat at the decision-making table, allows certain groups to have "two bites at the cherry". One bite occurs at the national level through lobbying of national governments and then a second at the international level. This might be particularly problematic if only certain sections of society have representation 13 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 'Conclusions: Return on the Legal Status of NGOs and on the Methodological Problems Which Arise For Legal Scholarship' in Dupuy and Vierucci (n.7) pp204-215. 14 Thus for example, private individuals are granted rights under human rights regimes, including procedural rights that enable them to hold States to account for breaches of certain obligations. Individuals may also be prosecuted for international crimes. Intergovernmental organisations have likewise been recognised as having such personality as they require to carry out their functions. While these developments in the law may leave the question of the rights and obligations of NGOs under international law unanswered, they suggest that the argument that only States should be involved in decision-making, as only they have personality in international law, is now rather dated. 15 at the international level. 16 A further argument for the exclusion of NGOs in particular is that they may lack ʺlegitimacy, meaning they are neither accountable to an electorate nor representative in a general way.ʺ 17
These arguments give cause to consider carefully the nature of participatory rights and the reasons for granting any such rights at the international level. If the object of participation is to ensure that any decisions best reflect society's preferences, then the criticisms weighed against NGO involvement are significant. To ensure that the decision-making processes maintain legitimacy in this context it would be necessary to design participatory rights in a manner that facilitated representation by a broad cross-section of society. If, by contrast, the objective is to improve decision-making through improving the quality of information available within a particular regime, then questions of representativeness or of marginalisation become less significant. What would be significant in this context is whether those involved in deliberations have access to, or bring with them, key information necessary for an informed decision.
These arguments give rise to further questions: what do we mean by participation and should participatory rights take a particular form?
The Meaning of Participation
In both theory and practice, there are a number of possible answers to the question of what participation involves. Arnstein first categorised the possibilities in her ladder of participation, and the possibilities have been expanded upon since then. Arnstein's categories are based upon the degree to which decision-making involves the public. 18 At the bottom of the ladder are processes which inform the public that the decision has been made, above these in terms of opportunity to participate sit processes involving consultation (where the public respond to questions or information given by the decision-maker, but have no role in making the final decision), to codecision-making (partnership) and finally, to fully delegated decisionmaking. Each level may, in practice, take a number of forms, such as:
hearings, focus groups, (internet) forums, roundtables, citizen forums, multiple stakeholder conferences, consensus-oriented meetings and multiple discussion circles. 19 One of the challenges in participatory decision-making is in determining the appropriate form and level of participation and appropriate limitations on engagement. Thus consideration has to be given to questions such as which actors should be given a right to participate, how they should be informed of Non-Governmental Organizations' (1996 While neither of these articles actually provide for civil society involvement in decision-making, what they do is highlight the reasons such participation may be needed. They highlight that in particular it is participation from indigenous groups within society that is thought to be particularly important, with participation from NGOs more generally following behind this. The motivation for such involvement may be either to improve the quality of information available in the decision-making process, or to improve the perceived legitimacy of the regime amongst certain sections of society with a view to enhancing their compliance with the regime or their involvement in decision-making relating to implementation. The former at first sight seems more credible since the lack of attention to other groups, such as industry, and the focus on particular sections of society, indicates that achieving legitimacy through deliberative democracy was not a concern of the Parties to the regime. It is, however, worth considering the fact that industry may be represented through NGOs and so while not mentioned by name its representation is not precluded by these provisions. Secondly, it may also be that a decision was taken to prioritize rights for indigenous peoples and NGOs generally to redress the fact that business interests are more likely to be taken into account in decision making because of the historically greater access to governments that business has had compared to other sections of society. Thus, while it appears more likely that the focus of the biodiversity regime is on improved information rather than delivering deliberative democracy, a clear conclusion on this point is not entirely possible. commitment to doing so is rather limited.
In general, then, the conclusion to be drawn on the objectives of participatory rights, as stated or implied from the founding documents of these regimes, is that they are included to improve the quality of decision-making and the quality of implementation of decisions within regimes. Whilst this may ultimately help improve the legitimacy of each of the regimes, there appears to be little desire amongst the Parties to use participatory processes as a means to improve the regimes' democratic legitimacy. In this context, the competing arguments of writers such as Anderson 34 and Charnovitz' 35 as to the appropriateness or otherwise of giving non-State actors full participatory rights, become less important. And, while the apparently limited approach to participatory rights may serve to disappoint some sections of society, it appears to accord with the general approach in international law as expressed in the Almaty Guidelines on Promoting the Application of the Principles of the Aarhus Convention in International Forums. Although these guidelines call for participation to be as broad as possible 36 they also recognise, in paragraph 31, the need for participation to be restricted at times. Practice elsewhere also shows a similarly limited approach to participatory rights.
Bettin, 37 for example, notes the limited role generally granted to NGOs in relation to development policy. In the field of marine biodiversity, there is, however, one notable exception to the general rule that participation is of the Wider Caribbean Region 38 which requires Parties to develop public awareness programmes and to involve the public "in the planning and management of protected areas" (Article 6). 39 As a counter to this exception it is also worth noting that there are some biodiversity regimes that make no an environment, at the regional level, in which collaboration and partnership (between all stakeholders and at all levels) in addressing the environmental problems of the South China Sea is fostered and encouraged and to enhance the capacity of the participating governments to integrate environmental considerations into national development planning. 42 The South Asia Co-operative Environmental Programme (SASCEP) goes further still in that not only does its Action Plan provide for cooperation with NGOs, but it is reliant on funding from external actors including NGOs.
There are, in addition, some organisations that set out to engage more fully in multi-stakeholder governance. For example, the Coral Triangle Initiative was established through the work of a consortium of States and NGOs and in its action plan repeatedly refers to working groups being established which encompass NGO representatives as well as other actors. 43 In respect of all of these regimes the aim of involving non-State actors appears to be focused entirely on enhancing the quality of implementation. Few of the arrangements are designed to create equal partnerships between States and non-State actors. In some instances it might be more accurate to describe the non-State actors as carrying out tenders for projects, rather than as partners.
Nevertheless these arrangements are likely to improve implementation and better implementation may ultimately improve the legitimacy of the regime, but that does not appear to be the primary objective of participatory decisionmaking in these regimes. governmental or non-governmental body can apply for observer status provided that they meet certain requirements for qualification. In the Biodiversity regime the requirement is that they be "qualified in fields relating to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity". 46 In CITES it is that they be "qualified in protection, conservation or management of wild fauna and flora". 47 No definition or explanation of the word "qualified" is given in either regime. Further detail is provided within the has shown that, on occasion, regulators unconsciously place more emphasis on some types of information than on others. 49 They may equally be likely to invite certain types of organisations rather than others. 50 Moreover, if the objective of the participatory processes were to be to help improve the legitimacy of decision-making then the existence of such wide discretionary powers would be problematic as it may be used to block participation by otherwise qualified participants.
Despite these potential problems, the same types of provisions as found in the In addition to the restrictions discussed above, many of the regimes place stricter limitations on some non-State actors than on others depending on the type of right to be granted. Thus there are variations in the criteria applied as between those seeking observer and those seeking partner status and there are variations in relation to the types of non-State actors engaged with. In the Mediterranean, for example, International and regional NGOs are distinguished from national and local NGOs. In both cases, the NGOs must satisfy a long list of criteria contained in the annex which basically require the NGOs to have expertise relevant to the Barcelona Convention and to be operative within the relevant region and able to contribute to the regimes activities through participating in projects and distributing information etc. National NGOs must also be able to show a genuine interest in marine issues.
Procedures are set out for approval of partnership status and accreditation is valid for 6 years. Similar criteria are laid down by a number of other regional seas regimes, including the Baltic, 58 and the North-East Atlantic. 59 Despite some variations between and within regimes in respect of different types of participation, the criteria used in determining whether or not to grant 
Modes of participation
Under all of the agreements reviewed, non-State actors, when granted observer or partner status, 64 are described as being able to participate in meetings but not vote. In most they are entitled to make oral or written submissions to meetings and in some they may make proposals that will be voted on if supported by a State Party. For example, the Mediterranean has adopted a code of conduct for its "partner" NGOs, which addresses their rights and duties. 65 These provide that NGOs are to be afforded the opportunity to make oral or written contributions to meetings, that their comments are to be reflected in the report of the meeting and they have the right to information. It is expressly noted that they do not, however, have the right to vote.
These types of participatory provisions accord with the recommendations of the Almaty Guidelines on public participation in international fora. 66 Under some agreements, however, certain further limitations on participation apply. observers at all may be present. 67 In other words the participatory rights granted to non-State actors might be described as equating to consultation and the provision of information, which are rather low in the hierarchy of participatory rights discussed in the literature. Thus, the rights enable them to be informed and to provide information to underpin decisions, but does not guarantee that the information they provide will actually be taken into account in any decision-making. Indeed as Holder notes, a right to submit oral or written comments is not quite the same as a right to influence decisions 68 in so far as a right to submit comments does not guarantee that those comments will in any way influence the decision makers. One might not, therefore, put much store by the granting of these rights in terms of improving citizen participation. Indeed there are other provisions which, while not directly related to the granting of participatory rights, also have a potentially negative impact upon their exercise. For example, the CBD Rules provide in Rules 10 and 13 that meeting agendas need only be distributed to Further distinctions are applied in other regimes. In CITES the Rules of Procedure provide that during plenary sessions and in committees and working groups observers are to sit in specially designated seating areas and may only enter the delegates area if invited by a delegate to do so (Rule 11) and that the media are to be similarly segregated (Rule 13.) While observers and the media may variously be invited or permitted to enter other areas, this segregation points to the limitation of rights and opportunities for non-State actors to engage with States during the decision-making processes. 70 The Mediterranean code of conduct referred to earlier also provides an example of differentiation in the level of participation afforded to different types of nonState actors. A distinction is drawn between international and regional NGOs on the one hand and national and local NGOs. The former are automatically entitled to participate in meetings, the latter must request special permission to attend a meeting or conference of direct concern to them and such requests are described as "exceptional". The provision of participatory rights through decisions or recommendations points to the possibility that Parties to regimes addressing marine biodiversity are growing increasingly aware of the benefits that participatory decision-making can bring. It is, however, also potentially problematic in that these provisions are easily revised. Whilst this may bring the advantage that States can refine the participatory rights as practice points to issues arising with them, it also means that such rights can be withdrawn more easily than were they enshrined in a treaty document. It means also that the only conclusion that can be drawn at this point in time, is that participatory rights tend to be afforded at the lower level of Arnstein's ladder of participation, though there may be a move towards granting greater rights. observer status is addressed, if at all, in rules of procedure. While the net effect in the different regimes might very well be the same in practiceobserver status is granted to non-State actors -the fact that some regimes address the question of such status in treaties, whilst others address it in soft law rules of procedure points to better protection of observer status in the former than in the latter. It is, after all, much easier to amend rules of procedure than it is to amend a treaty, not only procedurally but also in that there tends to be less scrutiny by the media and the public of amendments to what may be termed regulatory instruments than of legislative instruments such as treaties. These distinctions are, as noted earlier, magnified where the rights to participate are contained in decisions or recommendations of the regimes. Thus we can add additional categories to our types of participatory rights -permanent and fixed v. reversible and malleable. Given that in the majority of regimes, participatory processes appear to be designed to meet similar objectives, the fact that different categories of rights are granted may be presumed to impact on the legitimacy of regimes in different ways. The next section examines these issues.
Participatory Rights and Legitimacy
In general, the degree of participation afforded to non-State actors in the marine biodiversity regimes could be described as fitting with the objectives of the regimes in respect of participatory processes in that improving the flow of information between States and non-State actors should improve implementation of the regimes. Equally, however, none of the organisations discussed here could be described as providing cutting edge participatory rights. While some organisations do provide for partnership status, those that do tend to be soft law organisations, or to provide for partnership status in implementation. They could not then be described as being of an equivalent status to, for example, the rights provided by the parties to the Aarhus Convention where NGO representatives sit as members of compliance committees 84 holding States to account for breach of binding obligations. This may not be terribly surprising given that, in the context of marine biodiversity the reason for engaging non-State actors appears to be to enhance the capacity to take better quality decisions and ensure more effective implementation of agreed provisions, rather than to improve the democratic legitimacy of the regime. Yet the review of the levels of participation granted suggests that the rights may not be sufficient to ensure better quality outputs. The lack of guaranteed access to information, combined with the lack of guaranteed opportunity to present information to decision-makers in almost all contexts, are significant stumbling blocks to improved decision-making. The provisions on participation generally make no mention of a requirement to inform nonState actors of their rights, let alone of an obligation to seek out non-State actors to admit to the decision-making procedures. This approach to participation means that States remain in control of decision-making. If a regime's legitimacy is assumed to be dependent upon the use of participatory decision-making, the fact that States remain in control is unlikely to be perceived as improving the legitimacy of the regime. 85 In addition, the restriction of participation to organised interests only may undermine the overall legitimacy of the regimes. First it may reduce non-State actors confidence in the regimes and willingness to participate in them. Whether a reduction in confidence and willingness to engage arises or not, the restrictions on participation by non-State actors may mean that the regime outputs are weaker than could be hoped for as they may rest on a less than ideal range of information. Deliberation may also be diminished if there is no opportunity, or only a limited opportunity to take account of alternative views. 86 These conclusions then point to two areas for further research: establishing the nature of the outputs of decision-making in the marine biodiversity regimes and establishing the impact on the willingness of States and nonState actors to become or remain actively involved in the regime. At this point in time we might hypothesise that certain types of rights will lead to better quality of decisions and to improved legitimacy as a result. Those offering the fullest participatory rights (as illustrated in figure 1 ) appear more likely to achieve this than those offering only limited rights to a select group of observers.
The findings with regard to levels of participation point to a second legitimacy issue. Whether differentiation between different groups of nonState actors in terms of the level of participatory rights, or the ease with which they may be exercised, is appropriate to ensuring legitimacy or otherwise achieving the aims of the regimes is again debatable. While it is recognised that some limitation on the numbers of bodies participating may be necessary, the blanket criteria that are applied may not lead to the best possible may be best placed to provide information on the uses made of particular areas by them. Yet, some of the regional seas agreements make it very difficult for such groups to participate in decision-making and instead give preference to international groups, or to specialist non-State actors. The drawing of such distinctions is not, however, unique to marine biodiversity.
Kamminga, for example, discusses it in relation to NGO activities in the UN and other bodies. 87 ECOSOC, for example, distinguishes between the observer rights of non-Party States and the consultative rights of non-State actors. The latter are further split into general, special and roster status, with different criteria applied to the granting of each status. 88 Again, though this potential issue with legitimacy in marine biodiversity regimes points to an area in which further research should be undertaken.
In addition, the fact that the rights to participation are generally contained in rules of procedure and in decisions and recommendations means that such rights may easily be revised or removed. The potential uncertainty created by the nature of the provisions could again be felt to undermine the legitimacy of the regimes in the eyes of non-State actors. It does, as noted earlier, also provide greater opportunity for revision and improvement of such rights compared to enshrining them in treaty. This then points to a further issue for future research: it might be fruitful to establish both the nature and degree of change in participatory rights within marine biodiversity regimes, and the impact of any such change on the regimes' perceived legitimacy. This chapter has mapped out the types of participatory rights granted in regimes addressing marine biodiversity. The broad conclusion to draw from this mapping process is that guaranteed rights for participation by non-State actors are rather limited, though their rights to participate in soft law regimes or through soft law provisions attached to binding regimes are rather fuller.
Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research
In addition, it appears that certain groups tend to be privileged in the granting of participatory rights, in that international NGOs have greater rights than national or local and that indigenous or local communities are more likely to be referred to than the business community in the documents providing for participatory processes. In many respects the rights provided for non-State actors in the regimes discussed here are similar to rights in other areas of international law, though they do not accord with best practice. The mapping exercise is, however, just the beginning of the necessary research.
The next stage is to establish how closely practice mirrors the provisions discussed in this chapter. Do, for example, Parties to regimes strictly apply the threshold criteria contained in rules of procedure? Have they interpreted these criteria in set ways? And in this context, the impact that threshold criteria have on the willingness or desire of non-State actors to engage with regimes is also critical. It may be that other factors play a more significant role in influencing how non-State actors engage with regimes. For example, some NGOs have indicated that they prioritised working with certain international organisations (such as the climate change regime and CITES) over others (such as the Bonn Convention) as they saw more chances of their work having a positive impact. 89 The discussion has also shown a variety of routes being adopted to ensure flexibility in the criteria for the granting of observer or partner status. In 89 Prideaux n.58 at 5.
common with other areas of international law, 90 criteria tend to be contained in rules of procedure. The advantage of this practice is that these are flexible documents, which may be amended more readily than treaties. It also makes it possible to adopt different rules for different aspects of the work of the organisation. Some of the organisations provide for even greater flexibility by giving discretion to the Executive Director or Chair to invite entities to become observers. The question that then arises is which of these routes provides for the more objective approach to the granting of observer status i.e., which is the least subject to political influence. Kamminga suggests that the granting of observer status by the Secretariat alone, without the need for State approval 91 has proved more objective in practice in other areas of law.
Whether or not marine biodiversity follows these areas is a possible topic for further research. In addition, in the many marine biodiversity regimes where little guidance is given as to the criteria to apply when considering the granting of observer or partner status, it would be useful to establish whether or not criteria have been developed in practice. It would also be useful to establish whether or not any such criteria, or the lack of such criteria, impact upon the perceived legitimacy of the regimes. to the question of whether in fact the decision-making outputs are of a better quality as a result of participatory processes, further research is needed to establish whether or not this improves the legitimacy of the regime. In addition it might be fruitful to consider the comparative impact of participatory processes and lobbying on the impact of the perceived legitimacy or effectiveness of marine biodiversity regimes. 
